Management renewal?
Consequences of the new conception of the “best interests of the corporation” in North American and French Corporate Law by Tchotourian, Ivan
Management renewal? 
Consequences of the new conception of 
the “best interests of the corporation” in 
North American and French Corporate 
Law 
 
Ivan Tchotourian 
Associate Professor, University of Nantes (France) 
Associate Researcher, Chaire en droit des affaires et du commerce international, University of 
Montréal (Canada) 
tchout@yahoo.com 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Corporate law integrates a stakeholder conception through the comprehensive meaning 
of the best interests of the corporation. In this paper, I address criticisms about classical 
definition of the firm’s purpose. Even if American law is more discreet and uncertain, it is 
possible to defend a broad conception of the best interests of the corporation. The interests of 
Canadian and French firms include their partners. While the notion of intérêt social is 
debatable in France, Canada has recently modified its point of view regarding the purpose of 
the firm. Indeed, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada Magasins à rayons Peoples Inc. 
(Syndic de) v. Wise in 2004 changed the concept of corporate law. With respect to fiduciary 
duties, the Supreme Court set aside the traditional interpretation of the “best interests of the 
corporation” which gave primacy to shareholders’ interests. The Court held that the expression 
“best interests of the corporation” refers to the maximization of the corporation’s value. This 
innovative vision of the best interest of the corporation introduces stakeholder theory and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) into corporate law and provides a new field for the firm’s 
management to frame their responsibilities. This paper concludes with an extended discussion 
of the implications of stakeholder and CSR influence for the future of corporate law, economy 
and financial researches.  
 
Introduction 
 
The main goal of this research is to show how corporate law in Canada and France 
allows the effectiveness of CSR and stakeholder theory. This paper proposes to demonstrate 
the integration of these theories into the corpus of corporate law mechanisms. 
 
Today, the “best interests of the corporation” have a key position in both French and 
North American corporations. Indeed, the social interest of the company has substantial stakes 
in terms of politics, markets, and governance (Couret, 1996; Schmidt, 1995). First, the interest 
of the corporation guides the firm’s policies, particularly in terms of investment decisions, 
dividend distribution, or mergers. The interest of the corporation also has an effect on the 
market since it should understand the firm’s goals to allow for efficient decisions – a 
requirement for successful functioning of financial markets – purchasing, keeping, or 
 
suspending of titles. Finally, the power of the directors and managers and its limit vary in 
function of their acceptance of the interest of the corporation (Couret & al., 1996). The latter 
determines the scope of the directors’ discretionary space because of judicial review 
(Charreaux, 1997) and the conditions of responsibility that define it. The best interest of the 
corporation leads the governance of firms and determines the range of the missions of the 
board of directors (connected with the directoire in the case of a dual structure) (Bissara & al., 
2007). 
 
The interest of the corporation gains additional importance since the current governance 
of firms raises preoccupations that make their positioning difficult. The interest of the company 
appears to be an indispensable integration tool for the new paradigms of sustainable 
development, CSR, or even stakeholder theory at the heart of governance and legal framework. 
This is significant because “the last decade has seen the rapid growth of concerns about this 
under the titles of “stakeholder” and “corporate social responsibility”” (Charkham, 2005. For 
this tendency in Europe: Lozano & al., 2008). There is a real danger of contradiction between 
the objectives of corporate law and those of these innovative concepts. Given the incentives for 
maximizing profit and shareholder value, does corporate law recognize stakeholder theory and 
CSR? Through the definition of the interest of the firm, should the corporate law guarantee a 
serious and serene understanding of these paradigms (Javillier, 2007)? 
 
In this paper, I seek to answer this question. I do so by comparing American, Canadian, 
and French positions on the interest of the corporation. The consequences of these positions on 
the contemporary governance of firms will also hold our attention. This paper proceeds as 
follows. First, I expose the American jurists’ perception of the interest of the corporation to 
identify some important clues and doubts. Second, I present the perception of Canadian and 
French jurists through reference to recent choices. Since it constitutes a shift in the definition of 
the interest of the corporation, the study of the ruling Magasins à rayons Peoples Inc. (Syndic 
de) v. Wise by the Supreme Court of Canada (2004 CSB 68) – Peoples – is an opportunity to 
note that the North American model, which had served for a long time to justify the share-
value-driven model of companies, is undergoing profound mutations1. As a result, this paper 
makes some important contributions to the literature on corporate law and finance. 
 
Research methodology 
 
On the one hand, traditional legal analysis implies a three-step process: (1) a study of all 
the rules of law and relevant modes of regulation regarding company control; (2) an 
interpretation of these rules; and (3) a synthesis of the legal constructions from Europe and 
other countries (making a comparative analysis possible) on the maximization of the value of 
the firm. Within this framework, a comparative study between North America and France will 
be adopted and multiple sources will be evoked. Firstly, if the United States and France appear 
to have different philosophies, Canada adopts a median position. The recent Canadian decision 
Peoples is the best illustration of this (Rousseau, 2006; Lee, 2005; Rousseau, 2001). Secondly, 
legal rules are globally defined and from the legislative corpus and public authorities 
(Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States, Autorité des marchés financiers in 
                                                          
1 This article is a part of a scientific project lead by the Chair for the Law of Business and International Trade 
(University of Montréal) about “La responsabilité sociale des enterprises cotées”. This project is financed by the 
Research Grant Lavoisier (EGIDE) and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
(SSHR). I thank Professor Stéphane Rousseau (Director of the Centre for the Law of Business and International 
Trade, University of Montréal) for his welcome in the Chair and providing valuable comments on previous 
versions of this article. I am grateful to Colleen Mason for her correcting. 
 
Québec or in France) or private groups which intervene in the corporate world (these quasi-
regulatory functions are important because various stakeholders occur: Steger, 2006). 
 
On the other hand, traditional legal analysis will be supplemented by an economic 
analysis founded on the postulate that, in an effort to maximize their well-being, individuals 
make rational decisions by taking into account the costs and benefits that their choices generate 
(Posner, 2007; Chandler, 1992; Votaw, 1965; Coase, 1937). Economic theory allows for a 
better understanding of the joint stock company and the problems of governance. Among the 
various corporate theories, the nexus of contracts theory is as essential as analysis framework 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1979, 1976; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). According to this theory, the 
joint stock company can be considered as a legal structure that is used as the center for 
establishing contractual relationships. Moreover, this theoretical framework will be enriched by 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This theory diagnoses most conflicts (e.g., the 
propensity of managers to privilege their interests, the domination of shareholders to the 
detriment of other partners of the firm) and identifies the mechanisms that mitigate governance 
problems. Although they were frequently employed in the context of the shareholder primacy 
model, the nexus of contract and agency theories provide a rich framework for the stakeholder 
model and the CSR (Pesqueux & Damak-Ayadi, 2005; Lépineux, 2005; Phillips, 2003; 
Friedman & Miles, 2002; Blair & Stout, 1999; Phillips, 1997; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Freeman & Evan, 1990; Freeman, 1984). They recall studying the integrity of the contractual 
conditions that intervene in the parts of a joint stock company to understand its governance. 
The stakeholder theory can be seen as an extension of contractual theories of organizations, 
sharing with these the conception of the company as an individual voluntary association, united 
by a nexus of contracts, and organized to reach a particular goal (Mercier, 2001). The firm is a 
whole (Blair, 1995) and not a simple amalgam of shareholders (Re Exchange Banking 
Company, (1882) 21 Ch. 519, p.536 (C.A.)). 
 
Results and consequences 
 
This study reveals that the European and North American judicial corporate landscape 
has admitted for various interests (with varying intensity) other than those of its shareholders. 
 
The American position: discussions and future evolution (?) 
 
Even though exceeding the maximization of shareholders’ profits is affirmed neither in 
case law nor in doctrine, the “schizophrenia” of the legal conception of the company (Allen 
1992) and the incertitude that stems from it justify the new definition of the “best interests of 
the corporation”. This doubt is accentuated by the content of the statutes of American 
companies that refer to this concept in the assessment of company director duties. Indeed, 
nearly half of U.S. states adopted the “constituency statutes” that allow the board of directors to 
take into account the interests of non-shareholders when making decisions in the best interest of 
the company (Mitchell, 1992; Orts, 1992). Moreover, the American Law Institute is confused. If 
it announces a shareholder primacy, directors must respect ethics without considerations of 
profits for shareholders or for companies (Lee, 2006). This evolution is such that, though it is 
only currently potential, it has major consequences on the influence of the U.S. on the global 
corporate law and financial market scene. For evidence of this forward march, see Professor 
Lynn A. Stout’s appeal to renew the concept of social interest (Stout, 2007). 
 
A few American rulings illustrate the change in legal perception of the company and its 
interests. Often brought up as the foundation of a strictly share-based conception of the 
company, the Dodge Brothers lawsuit against Ford Motor Company in 1919 should be 
 
considered (Dodge v. Ford Moto Co., 170, N.W., 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)). After Henry Ford 
refused to distribute very large profits to shareholders and, instead, lowered the sales price of 
vehicles and hired new workers, the Michigan Supreme Court decided in favor of the 
shareholders and pointed out that only the shareholders had rights over the company. The 
company is set up first and foremost for the profit of the shareholders: “There should be no 
confusion (…) A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of 
the directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to 
(…) other purposes.” Nevertheless, American case law adopted ambiguous positions after this 
ruling.  
 
In 1953, the Smith Manufacturing Co v. Barlow decision of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court lead to a redefinition of the aim of the company (Smith Manufacturing v. Barlow, (1953) 
in Beauchamp & Bowie, 2003). On July 24, 1951, the board of directors of Smith, a 
manufacturer of valves and fire hydrants, voted to donate $1,500 to Princeton University. The 
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the company’s decision and said that individual 
shareholders, whose private interests rest entirely upon the well-being of the corporation, ought 
not to be allowed to ignore present-day realities nor stand in the way of the long-visioned 
corporate action in recognizing and voluntarily discharging its obligations.  
 
Next, the 1968 Schlensky v. Wrigley decision can be mentioned (Schlensky v. Wrigley, 
237 N.E.2d 776 (III. App. Ct. 1968)). While the minority of the Chicago baseball team firm’s 
shareholders asked for the installation of lights so that games could be played at night, the 
firm’s directors were so opposed to such a resolution, they used as a pretext the quality of life 
of the neighbors that would be affected around the stadium. The Federal Court, applying the 
law of the state of Delaware, judged in favor of the directors because the lower quality of life 
of those who lived around the stadium risked having a negative effect on the economic 
interests of the shareholders in the long term. 
 
In addition, in the case Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. de 1985 (Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)), the Delaware Supreme Court pointed out that 
the board of directors must protect the public interest when dealing with an unsolicited public 
offer and, to that purpose, consider the impact of the offer on those involved (i.e. creditors, 
consumers, employees and, perhaps, the general community). The field of public bids shows a 
swinging of the case law pendulum. Following the Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum case, decisions 
took non-shareholders into account only when profits benefit to shareholders and thus 
emphasize the obtaining of a better price (Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network 
Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 
(Del. 1989); Revlon v. MacAndrews, 506 A.2d 173, 193 (Del. 1986)). Some authors perceive 
an evolution of case law. Professor Lee feels that the 1985 decision is favorable to a long-term 
strategy that reconciles the interests of both shareholders and non-shareholders (Lee, 2004-
2005). 
 
Finally, with the decision Crédit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathé 
Communications Corp. (Crédit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathé Communications 
Corp., No 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS, 215 108 (Dec. 30, 1991)), the Delaware Supreme 
Court clearly changed its view in the case of conflicting interests between the shareholders and 
other involved parties of the firm. When a company has financial difficulties, the shareholders 
cannot to hold the board of directors responsible if they have not accepted to follow a high-risk 
strategy that is harmful to the company’s creditors. It can be added that since the ruling Dodge 
v. Ford, few decisions have been made in favor of the maximization of the wealth of 
 
shareholders. Except Long v. Norwood Hills Corp. (Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 380 S.W.2d 
451 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) and Katz v. Oak (Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 
1986)), other judges’ decisions (notably those from the state of Delaware) leave room for 
interpretation by referring to the interest of the shareholders and that of the company (for 
example, Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939)). Furthermore, American case law 
allows taking into consideration future shareholders and points to an ever-increasing protection 
of creditors (Re Trizec Corp., [1994] 10 W.W.R. 127 (Atla. C.A.)). 
 
American legal doctrine shows that the definition of “best interests of the corporation”  
is changing. A trend favoring stakeholders is progressively emerging (Mahoney, Asher & 
Mahoney, 2005; Blair & Stout, 2001; Black, 1999; Blair, 1995). Two jurists are clear on this. 
On the one hand, Professor Stout goes even to qualify equating the firm’s object with the 
interest of shareholders as an error, a judicial sport, or even an obsolete doctrinal curiosity 
(Stout, 2007). On the other hand, Professor Greenfield has developed new principles for 
American corporate law whose central element is that firms should serve the interest of society 
“as a whole” (Greenfield, 2006). Other American authors agree with this position and build 
bridges between stakeholder theory, CSR and the legal world. However, they are more 
reserved. Thus, Mr. Hansmann and Kraakmann recognize that one of the roles of law is to 
resolve the problem of agency between creditors, employees, and consumers (Hansmann & 
Kraakman, 2004). Though he may be skeptical about the fate of this type of attitude, Professor 
Mitchell also underlines that it is in the interest of American corporations to take into account 
another partners other than the shareholders that joint-stock companies indisputably need 
(Mitchell, 2003). On the same subject, Professor Clark takes a middle-ground position. 
Recognizing the primacy of the shareholders’ interest be respected by directors and managers 
in their fiduciary role, he concedes that they should take into account specific obligations that 
protect other groups affected by the activities of the firm (Clark, 1986). Along these lines, Mr. 
Sundaram and Inkpen defend a shareholder’s approach because it is “pro-stakeholder” 
(Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). 
 
Beyond legal developments, reconsidering shareholder supremacy is present in other 
scientific disciplines in the U.S. Compared to the situation of internal and external stakeholders 
of a business, Mr. Hopkins writes that “legislation does have a role to play in how business is 
conducted so as to protect the externals – consumer safety, ethically produced product and so 
on” (Hopkins, 2005). On a strategic level, Ms. Freeman and Mr. Evan insist that the law plays 
a role in favor of stakeholders by restricting managers and that economic and political 
institutions inherent in regulation today allow stakeholders’ expectations to be taken into 
consideration (Freeman & Evan, 1990). American financial specialists such as Professors 
Zingales and Rajan (Rajan & Zingales, 2004) question the paradigm of share value and the 
concentration of management’s efforts in favor of these business partners (Zingales, 2000; 
Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). 
 
Even if there is no clear attitude that emerges to supplant profit maximization (I 
recognize consequences of Peoples case are difficult to apply in takeovers: Rousseau & 
Desalliers, 2008), American law is not as favorable to shareholders as legal literature would 
like to think (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004; Romano, 2001; Bainbridge, 1993; Macey & 
Miller, 1993; Romano, 1990; Friedman, 1970). Moreover, the definition of the firm’s 
objectives in statutes of the majority of American businesses refer only to a legal purpose 
without other details about the defense of shareholders and arguments minimize the impact of 
the 1919 ruling. 
 
 
 
The French and Canadian positions: evolution in action 
 
While the situation is more debatable in France (neither legislators, judges, nor doctrine 
clearly defined notion of intérêt social), Canada has recently modified its viewpoint on the 
purpose of the firm. The Canadian position on the “best interests of the corporation” is rich 
with consequences. It constitutes a framing tool for directors’ responsibilities. Thus, if the 
function of a directors was considered for a long time to control the performance of other 
members of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972), today the role is more controlled to be more successful (Bournois & Duval-
Hamel, 2006). And yet, such control implies the definition of a specific framework. 
 
French position: the non exclusion from a wide view of the “best interests of the 
corporation” 
 
For lack of a legal definition, doctrine is divided between a single (the interest of the 
shareholder or the interest of the firm) and a plural analysis. 
 
Some people claim that the interest of the corporation should be the firm’s interest, that 
is to say, that it should include the interests of shareholders, employees, creditors, and even the 
State (Teyssié, 2004; Daigre, 1996; Durand, 1947). For Professor Despax, this interest should 
be the interest of the company that transcends the interest of its shareholders, which constitutes 
the limit of sacrifices of shareholders or employees (Despax, 1957). In the same way, Professor 
Paillusseau adds that “best interests of the corporation” are the company’s interest. It extends 
to assure the prosperity and continuity of the firm (Paillusseau, 1967). Directors and the 
majority should therefore act in accordance with the economic organism that the company 
represents. 
 
Others think that “best interests of the corporation” should be understood as the interest 
of shareholders that hope for the creation of wealth and optimization of bond value (Martin, 
2005; Ripert & Roblot, 2002). Based on articles 1832 and 1833 of the Code civil, Professor 
Schmidt thus considers the company would not be created for any other interest except that of 
its shareholders, who have the sole purpose of sharing the corporate earnings among 
themselves (Schmidt, 1995). The company’s highest objective is the sole interest of its 
shareholders while respecting legal and statutory obligations (Schmidt, 2000; Bissara, 2003; 
Bissara, 2002; Schmidt, 1995). 
 
Lastly, part of the doctrine adopts variable positions on the periphery of this dichotomy. 
Some make interest of the corporation a “standard”. In this sense, Professor Bertrel defends 
the theory of juste milieu that analyses society as a mixed concept social interest as a notion 
that, depending on the circumstances, favors long-term or short-term constraints (Bertrel, 
1997). Others see the interest of the corporation as a multiform notion with variable content 
that can take on two meanings: the sole interest of the shareholders or a large dimension that 
represents the interest of the institution sociétaire as a whole (Cozian, Viandier & Deboissy, 
2003). Still others see the interest of the corporation as a financial interest associated with the 
issue of power (Pirovano, 1995), either as a behavioral standard (Constantin, 1999), or as a 
modulable compromise (Chaput, 1993). Finally, some authors stress the legal entity to define 
the best interests of the corporation. By establishing the existence of an autonomous paralegal 
officer by registration at the corporate and trade register, the legal entity has a catalyzing effect 
that will bring out the distinct interests of each of its members (Bézard, 2004; Constantin, 
1999). 
 
 
The interest of the company debate affects the courts. Nevertheless, case law brings 
little light to the fog surrounding the interest of the corporation. Indeed, case law is 
characterized by an absence of delimitation of outlines of this concept, which does bring up 
difficulties since it is the judge precisely who is supposed to define them. The construction 
shows the incessant pendulum swinging between the interests of the shareholders, the interests 
of company, and the interests of the corporation. Many judgments also show this in regards to 
the misuse of company propriety (Poracchia, 2000; Vézinet, 1997). Even though magistrates 
claim that the law protects, in addition to the property of the firm, the interests of its 
shareholders and third parties, they have a restrictive vision of civil action and only grant to 
companies and their shareholders acting ut singuli (Dekeuwer, 1995). 
 
French corporate law, far from providing a solution to this debate about the “why” of 
companies, defines the best interests of the corporation in a variable way without unanimity. 
The report on businesses listed on the stock market in 2003 (MEDEF-Afep, 2003) shows the 
insufficiency of the French situation. On the one hand, article 1.1. of this report clarifies that 
the board of directors must act under all circumstances in the interest of the company. But, on 
the other hand, article 6.2. says that the board of directors should consider itself the 
representative of shareholders. Similarly, the French Asset Management Association (Afg) is 
not clear about the meaning of the interest of the corporation (Afg, 2008). While the board of 
directors should act in the best interest and for all the shareholders, it is recommended that its 
strategy and action should be part of the sustainable development of the business (Afg, 2008. 
The Institut Montaigne has the same position: Institut Montaigne, 2003). Yet, if none of the 
following arguments in the French debate justifies the exclusion of an “open” or wide view of 
the “best interests of the corporation”. I am forced to note that this affirmation lacks a solid 
foundation. 
 
It is unfortunate that a wider view of the interest of the corporation is not more prevalent 
whereas French corporations are opening up more and more to CSR, sustainable development 
and stakeholder theory. In its recommendation synthesis on the role and course of action of the 
board, the Institut Français des Administrateurs stresses that the board of directors should take 
into account the social responsibility of companies and develop the long-term value of the 
company (Institut Français des Administrateurs, 2007). Statistically speaking, while only 35% 
of companies were in conformity with the NRE law in 2003 (with a high rate of conformity for 
the companies on the CAC 40: Delbard, 2007), the rate rose to 80% in 2004. Moreover, despite 
some missing information (on suppliers or the territorial impact of activities), it must be 
recognized that firms increased both the quality and the quantity of information given in the 
social and environmental report. In the same way, the CFIE-Conseil on social and 
environmental information that analyzed the 2006 reports of companies on the stock market 
revealed that the transparency of the reports of sustainable development are slowly but surely 
making progress (Les échos.fr, 2007). 
 
Canadian position: the affirmation of a wide view to the “best interests of the 
corporation” 
 
While the Canadian situation was for a long time a restrictive conception of the best 
interests of the corporation (conceived with the limited interest of the shareholders), it has 
changed since the case law evolution of 2004. 
 
In article 122 of the Canadian Business Corporation Act, the interest of the corporation 
is mentioned to guide administrative conduct without any precise definition being provided. 
The traditional response of Canadian law was a predominance of shareholders’ interest 
 
(Rousseau & Crête, 2008). Canadian legal structure thus followed the American position as 
Professor Palmer so illustrates: the company means the shareholders, no external interest 
outside of that of the shareholders can be considered legitimate by (the) directors and managers 
(Palmer, 1967). Coming to contradict the principles expressed in previous decisions (Salomon 
c. A. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.)), the approach of Judge Evershed expressed in the 
famous 1950 ruling Ardene Cinemas clearly brought back the interest of the commercial 
corporation as that of its shareholders and foreshadowed the Canadian attitude to follow 
(Greenhalgh v. Ardene Cinemas (1950), [1951] 1 Ch. 286, p.291 (C.A.)). In this case, the 
magistrate pointed out that: “(…) the phrase “the company as a commercial entity, distinct 
from the corporators : it means that the corporators as a general body.” On the one hand, 
during takeovers of corporations by takeover bids, Canadian case law (influenced by the 
American Revlon decision of 1986: Nicholls, 2007; Halperin & Vaux, 1999) traditionally 
considered the director’s duty to the business, when a takeover is impending, consists in 
maximizing the value of short-term certification values for the shareholders’ benefit (Ventas 
Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment Trust, (2007) ONCA 2005; Re Sterling 
Centrecorp Inc., 2007 CANLII 32675 (ON S.C.); Casurina Limited Partnership v. Rio Algom 
Ltd., [2004] O.J. No. 177; CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western International 
Communications Ltd., (1998) 38 B.L.R. (2d) 196 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.); Pente Investment 
Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] O.J. Nº2036 (Gen. Div.); (1998) 42 O.R. (3d) 177 
(C.A.)). On the other hand, the duty of loyalty is a field in which Canadian courts have 
interpreted company interest as shareholders interest (Palmer v. Carling O’Keefe Breweries of 
Canada Ltd., (1989) 67 O.R. (2d) 161 (Ont. H.C.J.); Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [1972] 2 All. 
E.R. 929 (Ch.)). The Court of Appeal of Quebec in the Peoples case thus refused to recognize 
that the directors’ duty of loyalty could serve to protect the creditors’ interests that were 
weakened with the risk increase following the adoption of the new supply policy. If some 
advances were previously made in case law and legislation of corporate law (or the legislation 
of other legal branches), none had previously reached the amplitude of the Supreme Court 
decision of 2004. As the courts need to determine if an honest person, placed in a similar 
situation, would have sensibly believed that the operation was in the interest of the company, 
(Charterbridge Corp. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., [1970] Ch. 62, p.74 (R.-U. C.A.A)), directors have 
the discretion that allows them to act in the interest of other constituents other that the 
company’s shareholders from the moment they increase the patrimony of the company. 
Creditors can be included through the directors’ decisions (Re London, New York & Paris 
Association of Fashions Ltd., (1982) 40 C.B.R. n.s. 127 (Nfld. S.C.); Hansel & Gillies, 1996; 
Ziegel, 1993). Next to the duty of loyalty, obligation for accountability resulting from 
Common Law fiduciary duties also leaves space for a wide view of the firm’s objectives 
(Welling, 2006; Ribstein & Alces, 2006). 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada Magasins à rayons Peoples Inc. (Syndic 
de) v. Wise in 2004 changed the conception of corporate law. Pursuant to section 122 of the 
Canadian Business Corporation Act, directors have the duty to act honestly and in good faith in 
regards to the “best interests of the corporation” in mind. Traditionally, the expression “the 
best interests of the corporation” was interpreted as the interests of the shareholders as a 
whole, as expressed by their financial welfare. The shareholder primacy norm coupled with the 
principle of limited liability can result, however, in the externalisation of costs by the 
corporation at the expense of its other stakeholders. The Peoples case dealt precisely with this 
issue. In this decision, the Supreme Court had to decide whether directors of financially 
distressed corporations are accountable to creditors. Specifically, it raised the question as to 
whether the contractual creditors of a corporation bear uncompensated risk and, therefore, need 
some form of a protective legal mechanism to offset such risk. With respect to fiduciary duties, 
the Supreme Court set aside the traditional interpretation of the “best interests of the 
 
corporation” which gave primacy to shareholders’ interests (Rousseau, 2006). The Court held 
that the “best interests of the corporation” refer to the maximization of the corporation’s 
value. Even if creditors’ interests increase in relevancy as a corporation’s finances deteriorate, 
directors continue to owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation whose interests are not to be 
confused with the interests of the creditors or those of any other stakeholders. Although the 
traditional position in Canada was in favor of shareholder interest (Comité mixte sur la 
gouvernance d’entreprise, 2001), some decisions have already defended a true stakeholder 
conception (Re London, New York & Paris Association of Fashions Ltd., (1982) 40 C.B.R. n.s. 
127 (Nfld. S.C.); Teck Corporation v. Millar (1972), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288; Sun Trust Co., Ltd. v. 
Bégin, [1937] R.C.S. 305; Bergeron v. Ringuet, [1958] B.R. 222; Lizée, 1989). Nonetheless, 
these decisions were in minority and none had the impact of Peoples. This innovative vision of 
the best interest of the corporation is one method of integrating stakeholder theory and CSR 
into corporate law (Martel & Martel, 2008). But, the recent decision BCE is problematic 
because it rejects the influence of Peoples in takeovers: “There is no doubt that the directors of 
a corporation that is the target of a takeover bid – or, in this case, the Trustees – have a 
fiduciary obligation to take steps to maximize shareholder (unitholder) value in the process” 
(BCE Inc. (Arrangement relative à), (2008) QCCS 905 CANLII). 
 
The Possibility to Be Responsible 
 
Even if stakeholder theory and CSR are widely studied (recently: Zakhem & al. 2008; 
Freeman and al., 2007), there are few studies yet on the interactions between corporate law and 
these notions (McBarnet & al., 2007; Dodd, 1932). One of the most essential lessons of the 
“best interests of the corporation” is acknowledging the effectiveness of the stakeholder 
theory and CSR. It is possible to consider corporate law in the context of stakeholder interests 
(Wheeler & Sillanpää, 1997). Thus, stakeholder theory and CSR exceed the discipline of 
management to affect corporate law. The central discussion in countries (Gospel & Pendleton, 
2005) about the role of employees in companies provides an example of the evolution 
(Bottomley & Forsyth, 2007; Sarra, 1999). This implies the adaptation of certain rules, which 
apply to companies and adopt a different conception of the firm’s purpose. The modifications 
are fundamental for the firm’s managers. They must decide with stakeholders (Bonnafous-
Boucher, 2006). “The law leaves [them] the freedom to be irresponsible, but it does not make 
[them] irresponsible” (Lee, 2005). 
 
Finally, far from being an obstacle to maximize the value of the firm, legal tools (in 
Canada and France) strengthen this value by creating responsibility (Caby & Hirigoyen, 2005). 
The corporate law imposes to take care of all the contrarians (OECD, 2004) and this research 
gives strong legitimacy to the managers’ attitude in its favor (Jones & al., 2007). The 
apprehension of CSR and stakeholder theory in North American and French business law gives 
a great future to these theory in the matter of governance. In this way, sustainable development 
could not find a simpler expression in corporate law then through the stakeholder theory. 
Freeman and Velamuri propose the substitution of “Corporate Social Responsibility” with 
“Corporate Stakeholder Responsibility” (Freeman & Velamuri, 2006). McBarnet explains the 
creation of a new concept (“corporate accountability”) through the meeting between the law 
and the CSR (McBarnet, 2007). With this comparative view, it will be possible to offer new 
perspectives to corporate law (and to management of the firms) in evolution (Baird & 
Henderson, 2007; Valsan & Yahya, 2007; Stout, 2007; Greenfield, 2007; Mitchell, 2003). It is 
not the “end of corporate Law” (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004). 
 
This change in corporate law modifies the classic notion of the company. Corporate law 
recognizes that firms are the source of negative externalities and understands its stakeholders 
 
(Trébulle, 2007). Doesn’t this confirm what the majority of doctrine highlights about 
stakeholder theory: that it would be a constellation of collective interests, interests that are 
recognized as existing. The corporate law demonstrates the existence of an authentic “society 
of stakeholders”. This conclusion in the legal field reinforces economic writings such as Post, 
Preston and Sachs (Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002), Chandler (Chandler, 1992), Aoki (Aoki, 
1988; Aoki, 1984), Jameux (Jameux, 2005), Coriat (Coriat, 1994) that redefine the firm 
without borders (Quélin, 2002; Pesqueux, 1987). The same is true for directors such as Savall 
and Zardet who replace an old perception of the firm based on hierarchical ideas and 
specialization for a new perception based on the concept of contractualization (Savall & 
Zardet, 2005). Because of the opening of markets, diffusion of new technologies, 
fragmentation of markets, disruption of production methods, and recognition of stakes linked 
to innovation and knowledge, a new industrial organizational method is being developed by 
which cooperative strategies between a variety of heavily interdependent agents are redefining 
the firm. The firm then appears as a set of multilateral contracts between stakeholders 
(Bainbridge, 2002) whose importance and expectations vary but who have a specific goal 
(Mercier, 2001). 
 
This proposition has significant implications for future financial research about 
performance. This new vision of the firm leads to a profound evolution in measuring its 
performance. Studies show that even we must resort to a firm’s financial performance to know 
if the stakeholders’ expectations have been respected by a company and, inversely, one must 
measure the social performance to determine financial performance (Igalens & Gond, 2003). 
Why the need to compare the stakeholders’ expectations with the financial performance of the 
firm? Why show that this respect leads to better financial performance? The only answer that 
seems to justify the search for such interaction is that the stakeholders’ expectations are 
perceived in monetary terms. The logic behind the accounting system is based on a definition 
of property according to which a firm is the propriety of its shareholders, who are the only 
party with the right to appropriate the remainder estimated to be equal to book profit. If 
comparing social performance with financial performance can teach a lesson, it must not be 
forgotten that the two notions are of a different nature or kind. Financial performance comes 
down to numbers, taking into consideration accounting and stock information, and it offers a 
short-term vision. Social performance or “stakeholder satisfaction” admittedly refers to 
monetary (the shareholders are included in the stakeholder category) and others expectations 
(e.g., protection of working conditions, importance of the environment) and implies a 
maximization of the firm’s value in the long-term (stakeholder theory justifies that 
shareholders are not the sole people to be taken into account) (Jensen, 2001). As a 
consequence, evaluating stakeholder satisfaction should take place on two levels: the growth of 
value and of other purposes of the firm (Freeman & al., 2007; Harrison & Freeman, 1999; 
Charreaux & Desbrières, 1998). Only long-term value growth of the firm will allow the 
company’s performance to be measured. To do so, quantitative performance criteria are 
indispensable tools (Mitchell, 2003). Blair’s developments on the place of human capital 
demonstrate the necessary linking to a quantitative tool. The human rights of property 
(belonging to employees), though clearly separate from financial rights of property (belonging 
to shareholders) are expressed through the actions of employees. These actions therefore attest 
to the performance of non-financial capital of the firm and show that reference to a quantitative 
tool can be abandoned. However, it must be added to this first criterion of quantitative value, a 
second criterion: the firm exists for other purposes than the growth of its financial value (Al 
Gore, 2007). Measuring company performance requires taking into consideration the diversity 
and interdependence of firm’s stakeholders, both internally and externally (Pasquero, 2005). 
This criterion remains that the path bringing invested capital in resources that creation of value 
 
is a complex process and imply taking into account the clients’ judgment(s) on the products or 
their quality. 
 
This paper is an original attempt to associate management, economy, and corporate law. 
I tried to demonstrate the existence in corporate law of effective tools to struggle against the 
famous “Frankenstein tendency” of firms (Wormser, 1935). 
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